



Auktorisoidun kääntäjän tutkinto 11.11.2023

Kielet ja käännösuunta

englannista suomeen

Aihepiiri (aukt3)

tekniikka

Käännöstehtävä

Käännettävä teksti on seuraavalla sivulla. Teksti on

EPA: Chemical accident investigation report

Lähde: EPA CHEMICAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT - Tosco Avon Refinery, Martinez, California (November 1998) | US EPA ARCHIVE DOCUMENT

Käännöksen käyttötarkoitus:

Vahingonkorvausta koskevaa oikeudenkäyntiä varten

Käännettävä teksti on lyhennetty alkuperäisestä tutkintoa varten, eikä siitä tehtyä käännöstä merkitä otteittaiseksi käännökseksi

Laadi käännös Suomen kääntäjien ja tulkkien liiton auktorisoidun kääntäjän ohjeiden mukaisesti. Nimeä käännös ja kirjoita vahvistuslauseke.

Huom! Älä kuitenkaan kirjoita käännökseen omaa nimeäsi, sillä käännös arvioidaan anonymisti.

Käännettävän tekstin pituus 2003 merkkiä.

Executive Summary of the Tosco Accident Investigation

The immediate cause of the hydrocarbon and hydrogen release and subsequent fire was a failure and rupture of a Stage 2 Reactor 3 effluent pipe due to excessively high temperature, likely in excess of 1400°F. This high operating temperature was initiated by a reactor temperature excursion that began in Bed 4 of Reactor 3 and spread through the next catalyst bed, Bed 5. The excessive heat generated in Bed 5 raised the temperature in the reactor effluent pipe. The excursion was not brought under control because the Stage 2 reactors were not depressured and shut down as required when the reactor temperatures exceeded the 800°F temperature limit specified in the written operating procedures.

The temperature excursion began with a hot spot in Bed 4 Reactor 3. The hot spot was most likely caused by poor flow and heat distribution within the catalyst bed. Investigators could not determine the specific cause of the maldistribution. Operators did not activate an emergency depressuring of the reactors when some internal reactor temperature readings reached 800°F because they were confused about whether a temperature excursion was actually occurring. Their confusion was due to a variety of factors including: fluctuating temperature readings, a discontinuation of makeup hydrogen flow to Stage 2, a misleading recycle hydrogen purity analysis and the absence of additional audible high temperature alarms after the first high temperature occurrence. They were attempting to verify temperatures in the reactor by having an operator obtain temperature readings from the field panels under the reactors. Poor radio communications hampered relaying these readings to the control room. Even after operators in the control room noticed that the Reactor 3 inlet temperature had increased beyond 800°F, they did not depressure but began to take steps to cool the reactor by increasing quench hydrogen flow and reducing heat input from the trim furnace.